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In recent years, the Journal of Policy History has emerged as a major venue
for scholarship on American policy history in the period after 1900.
Indeed, it is for this reason that it is often praised as the leading outlet
for scholarship on American political history in the world. Only occa-
sionally, however, has it featured essays on the early republic, the Civil
War, or the post–Civil War era. And when it has, the essays have often
focused on partisan electioneering rather than on governmental institu-
tions.1 The rationale for this special issue of the Journal of Policy History is
to expand the intellectual agenda of policy history backward in time so as
to embrace more fully the history of governmental institutions in the
period before 1900. The six essays that follow contain much that will be
new even for specialists in nineteenth-century American policy history,
yet they are written in a style that is intended to be accessible to college
undergraduates and historians unfamiliar with the period.
The paucity of scholarship on nineteenth-century policy history can
be explained in part by the relative novelty of the field. The first meeting
of a group of historians to talk self-consciously about policy history did
not take place until 1978, when political historians Thomas K. McCraw
and Morton Keller convened a conference on this topic at Harvard
University.2
A further impediment to the study of nineteenth-century policy 
history has been the implicit presumption of many twentieth-century pol-
icy historians that nineteenth-century policy history is an oxymoron, a
contradiction in terms. In the nineteenth century, or so it is often
assumed, party leaders driven by a “partisan imperative” dominated the
policy process.3 The conflation of nineteenth-century public policy with
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partisan electioneering would have puzzled nineteenth-century lawmak-
ers—since they devoted enormous energies to the drafting of legislation,
the structuring of institutions, and the regulation of markets. Yet it fol-
lows plausibly from a central tenet of the present-day historiography of the
United States: namely, the assumption that governmental institutions are
ultimately the product of antecedent social circumstances. Each essay in
this special issue challenges this assumption. Although none treat 
governmental institutions as altogether independent of the wider society,
they share the premise that, to a significant degree, governmental institu-
tions were autonomous—and, thus, potential agents of change.
A major theme of this special issue is the extent to which public 
policy in the pre-1900 period was not only a prelude to what came later,
or a promise that has been lost, but a project with a more-or-less coherent
design that grew out of the institutional arrangements established by the
founders of the republic. No one would have envisioned how the project
would play out. Yet this was not the point. The key was the presumption
that governmental institutions could shape the future of American soci-
ety. Indeed, perhaps the most basic claim that these essays advance is the
idea that there did in fact exist in the nineteenth-century United States
a regulatory regime, as opposed to a constellation of discrete and often
unrelated public policies. The federal Constitution—and, more broadly,
the European Enlightenment out of which the Constitution emerged—
cast a long shadow in the subsequent history of public policy in the
United States.4 The project was a ruling passion in a dual sense.
Nineteenth-century lawmakers were passionate believers in the centrality
of political economy to moral philosophy: the idea that political econ-
omy and morality might somehow be divorced would have struck them
as bizarre.5 In addition, lawmakers were preoccupied with the construc-
tive channeling of the passions of self-interested individuals—such as
greed, envy, complacency, and laziness. Toward this end, they designed
various regulatory mechanisms to discipline the market and unleash
human creativity. These mechanisms were so pervasive that the political
economy of nineteenth-century America is best characterized not as a
market economy but as a regulatory regime.6 In this dual sense, then,
“ruling passions” is an appropriate title for a collection of essays that
explores the history of political economy in the nineteenth-century
United States.
In no sense do we intend this special issue to be comprehensive.
Rather, we seek to reorient our understanding of nineteenth-century pub-
lic policy by highlighting its distinctiveness and, more broadly, its embed-
dedness in institutional arrangements that antedated the emergence of
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the mass political parties in the 1830s. Among the most important of
these institutional arrangements were federalism—that is, the principles
governing the relationship between the federal government and the
states—law, and public administration.7 In keeping with what we under-
stand to be the central concerns of nineteenth-century lawmakers, these
essays focus on a single policy realm—the relationship of the state and the
market—or what nineteenth-century contemporaries would have called
“political economy.” We look forward to other special issues that might
focus on such related, yet distinct, public policy realms as the relationship
of the state and the citizenry, the relationship of the state and the inter-
national arena, and the relationship of the state and the public sphere.
It might seem obvious to contend that the founding of the United
States shaped the subsequent history of public policy in the United
States. Yet, oddly enough, policy historians have been reluctant to link
the founding era with the nineteenth century.8 To explain why, it is use-
ful to discuss two of the foundational works for historians of nineteenth-
century public policy: Richard L. McCormick’s Party Period and Public
Policy: American Politics from the Age of Jackson to the Progressive Era (1986)
and Stephen Skowronek’s Building a New American State: The Expansion of
National Administrative Capacities, 1877–1920 (1982).
From its publication in 1986 to the present, McCormick’s Party
Period and Public Policy has set the agenda for a generation of historians of
nineteenth-century public policy. Few generalizations about nineteenth-
century public life have been more compelling for policy historians than
the assumption that it was a “party period” dominated by party leaders.
The “idea” of a nineteenth-century “party period,” for example—one of
McCormick’s major interpretative contributions—has recently been
termed the “most noteworthy achievement of modern research into nine-
teenth-century political history” and the field’s “most powerful con-
cept.”9 Although McCormick included the phrase “public policy” in his
title, his characterization of its scope was quite limited. In the nineteenth
century, McCormick famously posited, “‘policy’ was little more than the
accumulation of isolated, individual choices, usually of a distributive
nature.”10 To reach this conclusion, McCormick excluded from public
policy many issues of interest to policy historians today. These included
slavery, foreign relations, communications, military procurement, intel-
lectual property rights, and the many kinds of economic regulation that
fell outside the immediate purview of legislators. His primary focus,
instead, was on certain policy issues that provoked legislative debate—for
example, the sale of government-owned land and the enactment of 
favorable tariff rates. Such policies were “highly divisible” in the sense
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that they could be repeated again and again.11 “Forever giving things
away,” McCormick lamented, “governments were laggard in regulating
the economic activities they subsidized.”12 In making this claim, he con-
veniently overlooked those other policy arenas in which compromise was
more difficult to sustain.
McCormick’s characterization of nineteenth-century public policy
proved influential not only because of his masterful engagement with the
existing historical literature but also because of his willingness to chal-
lenge the many historians who continued to regard elections, rather than
government, as the “mainsprings” of American politics.13 In McCormick’s
view, government—understood to embrace “popular expectations” for
governmental action, as well as the rules and opportunities for “getting
the using the power of the State”—was at the core of political history: “In
every era, the kind of party politics that people practiced depended 
primarily upon the rules for obtaining office, the accepted functions of
government, and the actual State structures. When governance changed,
the parties changed, although the reverse was not always the case.”14 The
study of “governmental policy,” McCormick declared—in a critique of his-
torical scholarship on electoral politics—should thus become as “system-
atic” as the study of elections: “There is an urgent need for a satisfactory
typology of governmental policies, for new methods of describing and cat-
egorizing those policies, and for new ways of identifying the significant
governmental transformations in American history.”15 At the time he was
writing—during the heyday of the “new” social history, with its insistent
focus on rewriting history “from the bottom up”—this insight was 
relatively novel.16
Having conceded a good deal to governmental institutions at a time
when many political historians remained preoccupied with the analysis of
electoral outcomes, McCormick seemed to many to have staked out a
sensible middle ground. In his view, “distributive policies”—that is, the
distribution by legislators to particular claimants of discrete and often
highly particularistic economic favors (such as a land sale or a favorable
tariff)—had “enormous potential” for stimulating and sustaining party
conflict, since they could be contested both ideologically by champions
and critics of economic development and practically by rival entrepre-
neurs. The resulting party-led competitive free-for-all so dominated
American politics in the decades between the 1830s and the 1890s—or so
McCormick contended—that this era was best characterized as the “party
period” in American public life. The party leaders who distributed these
favors led the mass political parties that emerged in the 1830s and
retained “governmental hegemony” until after 1900, when social and
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economic changes led to a new pattern of American politics.17 Only after
1900, in McCormick’s view, would regulation and administration come
to supplement distribution as a defining feature of public policy. Only
after 1900 would the “party period” come to an end.18
Each of the contributors to this special issue echoes McCormick’s
contention that economic policymaking was the “most characteristic”
activity of American government at the state, federal, and local levels.19
Yet none adopt the “party period” paradigm as an interpretative frame for
understanding the political economy of the United States in the period
between the 1830s and the 1890s, or characterize the trajectory of eco-
nomic policymaking in this period as a shift from distribution to regula-
tion.20 Distributive benefits, such as the granting of a corporate charter,
did shape several of the industries that the essayists consider, including
banking and coal. Yet they were no means the only, or even the most
characteristic, kind of government economic policy. For each, the nine-
teenth-century political economy was, from the beginning, a regulatory
regime. And for each, policymaking was by no means the exclusive pre-
rogative of the partisan officeholders who McCormick assumes to have
dominated the policy process.
The contributors to this collection found no more helpful the
widely accepted characterization of the nineteenth-century American
state as a state of “courts and parties.” This characterization was
launched by political scientist Stephen Skowronek in his influential
Building a New American State, and has become adopted in the past
decade or so by many historians—including policy historians—eager to
find some pithy way to characterize the nineteenth-century American
state.21 Since Skowronek’s book was published before McCormick’s, it
might make sense to consider it first. Yet New American State was
embraced more slowly than Party Period, at least among historians. For
example, though McCormick praised New American State in his notes, he
did not explicitly embrace the “courts-and-parties” construct in his text,
at least in part because he had originally published most of the essays on
which his book had been based prior to 1982, when New American State
appeared.22
The “courts-and-parties” construct expanded on the party period
paradigm by emphasizing the instrumental role not only of party leaders
but also of jurists. For Skowronek, the nineteenth-century American state
had two main dimensions: a court system that fostered economic devel-
opment and a party system that embodied the ideal of popular sover-
eignty. Courts were the “chief source” of “economic surveillance,”
pushing the government into a predictable but flexible pattern of 
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support for capital accumulation; parties, in contrast, “organized govern-
mental institutions internally” through the disbursement of political
patronage, or what contemporaries called “spoils.”23 Courts and parties
were, in this way, stand-ins for capitalism and democracy—the protean
social forces lurking in the wings of so much historical writing on nine-
teenth-century America. Missing from Skowronek’s analysis was an
autonomous administrative apparatus—or “bureaucracy”—a circum-
stance, he speculated, that helped to explain the “sense of statelessness”
of nineteenth-century politics.24
While McCormick was plainly troubled by the limitations of the
party period, Skowronek found in the state of courts and parties much to
admire. Indeed, in his conclusion, he opined that an attack on the pres-
ent-day administrative state (the “bureaucracy”) might lead to a revitaliza-
tion of the courts as articulators of “coherent standards of state action”
as well as to a “revival” of “party organization”—a “happy if long-delayed
redress” of the over-elaboration of the administrative state that had begun
in the early twentieth century.25 For McCormick, the party period was a
prelude to the rise in the early twentieth-century “progressive” era of the
regulatory and administrative state, an innovation of which he basically
approved. For Skowronek, in contrast, the state of courts and parties was
a valuable counterweight to the “all-consuming bureaucracies” of the
twentieth-century—making it less of a prelude to a better future than a
promise that might one day be restored.26
The relative slowness with which historians embraced the courts-
and-parties construct—in comparison, at least, with the “party period”
paradigm—owed something to the implicit presumption of champions of
the courts-and-parties construct that the United States in the nineteenth
century had in fact had a state that was in some way comparable to the
nation-states of Europe. Even a state of courts and parties, after all, was a
state. Since many if not most post–World War II historians have regarded
U.S. political history as “exceptional” in the sense of being radically dif-
ferent from the political history of the nation-states of Europe, this pre-
sumption was only haltingly embraced.27 For historians as well as political
scientists, the statelessness of the nineteenth-century United States—not
only in perception but also in fact—had by the 1980s become a rigid
orthodoxy that senior scholars fiercely defended, largely for ideological
reasons stemming from their opposition to fascism and Stalism and their
hostility toward the Cold War Soviet Union.28
The eventual embrace by historians of the courts-and-parties con-
struct was symptomatic of a larger sea-change in historical sensibility.
Around 1980 it became once again acceptable—as it had been before
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World War II, but had only rarely been since 1945—for U.S.-based scholars
to conceive of the United States as a state from the moment of its 
founding. Now that historical sociologists such as Theda Skocpol were
“bringing the state back in”—as she did, in an influential essay published
in 1985—it seemed high time that historians fall in line. This embrace was
in one sense curious, since Skowronek based his characterization neither
on existing historical scholarship nor on a detailed engagement with the
primary sources. Rather, he derived it largely from classic texts in political
theory, supplemented by the nineteenth-century social theorists Alexis de
Tocqueville, Karl Marx, and Georg Friedrich Hegel—only one of whom
had ever set foot in the United States.
Morton Keller set the tone in a thoughtful review of New American
State in Reviews in American History, which appeared in June 1983.
Skowronek’s state of courts and parties, Keller noted approvingly, was a
“decentralized, bourgeois, liberal system of government in which political
parties were the carriers of popular democracy and courts served the
needs of private enterprise.”29 Although Keller contested Skowronek’s
claim that an altogether “new” American state had emerged in the early
twentieth century, he found little to fault in Skowronek’s characterization
of the nineteenth-century state it supplanted.30 That Keller endorsed the
courts-and-parties construct was in one sense unsurprising: in certain
respects, it echoed Keller’s own characterization of the nineteenth-century
“polity” (Keller mostly avoided the term “state”) that he himself had set
forth in his recently published Affairs of State (1977), a richly detailed his-
tory of late nineteenth-century public life. To be sure, Keller characterized
this state as more of a “pattern” than a “patchwork,” the term Skowronek
preferred. Yet he shared Skowronek’s admiration for the compromises of
nineteenth-century jurists and party leaders as well as his conviction that
courts and parties were the “dominant” public institutions of the day.31
New American State is justly regarded as a landmark in the emergence
of policy history as a distinctive field of inquiry for historians, political
scientists, and historical sociologists.32 Following its publication, a gener-
ation of scholars turned their attention to the role of governmental insti-
tutions in the making of the modern United States. Much of this
scholarship, like New American State, is concerned primarily with devel-
opments that culminated in the period after 1900.33 Only rarely have pol-
icy historians used the courts-and-parties construct to explore in detail
policy issues that were more or less confined to the nineteenth century,
such as slavery or abolition. None of the contributors to this special issue
find the courts-and-parties construct particularly useful, a telling sign of
its limitations. After all, the construct had been originally designed to
RICHARD R. JOHN 7
explain developments not in the nineteenth century, but in the twenti-
eth. New American State explored the rise in the early twentieth century of
administrative agencies that, in Skowronek’s view, had supplanted older—
and in certain respects more praiseworthy—governmental institutions
that he associated with the nineteenth century. Although hardly nostal-
gic, it betrayed—especially in its conclusion—a certain yearning for a world
we had lost. In this way, its characterization of the early American state
was more of an expression of a late twentieth-century political impulse
than an empirical investigation of the political project on which nine-
teenth-century Americans had embarked.
The authors of the essays that follow differ in matters of emphasis, but
they share the conviction that the “party period” paradigm and the
“courts-and-parties” construct are inadequate interpretative frames
through which to view the nineteenth-century political economy. Their
dissatisfaction stems in large part from the conviction that these frames
are unduly restrictive.34 Although they illuminate certain facets of the
American political economy, they obscure more. In particular, they exag-
gerate the influence on policymaking of party leaders, underestimate the
integrity of the judiciary, and neglect the often-vital role in the policy
process of administrators, lobbyists, and property owners (including
slaveholders). Several of the contributors touch on electoral politics, but
none make it a central theme or treat it as the benchmark against which
present-day public life ought to be judged. No “partisan imperative,” in
short, defined the “political nation”—to borrow two phrases from politi-
cal historian Joel H. Silbey. None proclaim, following Silbey, that the
“partisan institutional framework” of nineteenth-century politics was
then—and remains now, over a century later—“critically and absolutely
necessary for the effective operation and health of the American politi-
cal world.”35 On the contrary, the contributors emphasize the impor-
tance for policy outcomes of structural factors that were only tangentially
related to electoral politics—including federalism, law, and public admin-
istration. All highlight the preoccupation of lawmakers with restraining
the disruptive passions of certain groups, whether southern yeoman, 
military contractors, corporate promoters, independent inventors, 
savings bank trustees, or investors. None find it adequate to characterize
the resulting policy outcomes as merely distributive, in the sense that
every claimant could get a piece of the pie. Some policy outcomes were
more or less predictable; others were not. Yet they fell into certain pat-
terns. All challenge the now thoroughly discredited notion that the 
nineteenth-century was a world of “laissez-faire” in which market forces
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reigned unchecked; several draw attention to certain features of the
nineteenth-century regulatory regime that were decidedly antidemocratic
and even antiliberal.
Among the distinctive features of these essays is their sensitivity to
the language lawmakers deployed to justify their conduct. None regard
self-interest in a narrow sense as an adequate characterization for the
behavior even of party leaders, while several explicate the often-over-
looked cultural and institutional context that shaped the policy 
pronouncement of public figures such as Alexander Hamilton and
Roscoe Conkling.36 And, finally, none try to establish a “usable past” for
present-day party leaders by purporting to delineate a political tradition
that links, say, Andrew Jackson with Al Gore, or Abraham Lincoln with
George W. Bush.37
The “party period” paradigm treated as a single unit an epoch in
American history—the 1830s to the 1890s—that was marked by extraordi-
nary change. The most fundamental change was the Civil War and the
abolition of slavery—events central to essays by Robin L. Einhorn and
Mark R. Wilson. The “tax systems” of the early republic, Einhorn demon-
strates, were decisively shaped by the political economy of the individual
states and, above all, by slavery. In those states in which slavery remained
economically vital, tax codes proscribed elected officials from valuing per-
sonal property; in those states in which slavery had been abolished, the
local assessment of personal property was common. The contrast,
Einhorn contends, can be explained by the refusal of slaveholders to sub-
ject themselves to the democratic politics of tax collection. A far different
situation prevailed in the North, where fiscal conservatives like Alexander
Hamilton had good reason to fear the power of democratic politics: “If
northern elites complained more vociferously about democracy than
southern elites did in the early republic, it was because the political
arrangements of the North included more democratic arrangements to
complain about.” The refusal of slaveholders to permit a “politics” of tax-
ation went far to resolve the so-called “American paradox” that historian
Edmund S. Morgan associated with colonial Virginia: that is, the comple-
mentarity of black slavery and white freedom. “There was no ‘American
paradox’ locking democracy and slavery in a fatal embrace in American
history,” Einhorn concludes: “On the contrary, there was more democracy
where there was more liberty: in the places where most people were free.”
The persuasiveness of Einhorn’s conclusions rests in large measure
on her resolute institutionalism. Unimpressed by the supposedly
momentous significance of even “revolutionary” electoral victories (such
as Thomas Jefferson’s triumph in the election of 1800) and committed
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to recovering the social context out of which the public pronouncements
of often-disparaged statesmen emerged (such as Alexander Hamilton’s
strictures on democracy), she grounds her analysis in the “institutional
reality” codified in state-level statutory law. The result is a stunning 
reinterpretation of American tax policy that underscores the uncompro-
mising refusal of slaveholders and eventually, following the abolition of
slavery, corporate managers to permit their assets to be subjected to the
give-and-take of democratic politics.
The limitations of the “party period” paradigm are further elabo-
rated on in Wilson’s revisionist analysis of the origins of bureaucratic
autonomy in modern America. Civil War military procurement, Wilson
demonstrates, was not only one of the largest single economic projects
undertaken in the nineteenth-century United States, but it was also a 
case-study in the bureaucratic autonomy of the nineteenth-century mili-
tary. The project was coordinated not by Republican party leaders—as
champions of the party period paradigm had assumed—but instead by
high-ranking, careerist military procurement officers. The origins of these
officers’ bureaucratic autonomy, Wilson posits, antedated the war and
dated back to reforms in the War Department instituted by secretary of
war John C. Calhoun immediately following the War of 1812. In the
United States—no less than in Great Britain, France, or Prussia—big gov-
ernment preceded big business, with the military leading the way. The
autonomy of procurement officers owed less to their cultivation of a
favorable public reputation, as political scientist Daniel P. Carpenter
might contend, than to their formal authority.38 “In the very heyday of
what is often called the ‘party period,’” Wilson concludes, “there existed
in the Quartermasters’ Department a resilient, and potentially powerful,
reservoir of bureaucratic autonomy that was distinct from, though never
entirely unrelated to, the partisan imperative long assumed to have been
the dominant political force of the age.” The formal authority of Civil
War era procurement officers, in turn, furnished a template for the cre-
ation in the post–Civil War period of the giant, bureaucratic organiza-
tions that would by the mid-twentieth century become a defining feature
of American business, government, and the professions.39
The limitations of the courts-and-parties construct are very much in
evidence in essays by Sean Patrick Adams and Steven W. Usselman and
Richard R. John. The coal industry in nineteenth-century America,
Adams demonstrates, was shaped by a constellation of public policies at
the state and federal level that culminated in a single, highly significant
outcome: an abundance of cheap coal. At all levels of government, the
maximization of output was the paramount goal. “Nature made coal
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abundant,” Adams observes, while “public policy made it cheap.” In this
policy mix, state governments were often rivals, while administrative 
bodies at both the state and the federal level sponsored geological surveys
to encourage the rapid extraction of mineral wealth. The resulting com-
petitive free-for-all was less the product of happenstance than of deliber-
ate design: a design rooted ultimately in the planned decentralization that
was—and is—a hallmark of federalism. Coal policy might seem to be
merely distributive, yet even here there were winners and losers, and not
even Franklin Gowen, as the owner of a large railroad and coal mine
empire in Pennsylvania, could circumvent the logic of federalism and 
corner the market for coal.
Few conclusions have been repeated more often by historians of nine-
teenth-century economic policy than the irrelevance of the federal govern-
ment to the regulatory process in the period before the enactment of the
Interstate Commerce Act in 1887 and the Sherman Antitrust Act in
1890.40 Yet this characterization of the nineteenth-century political econ-
omy is vulnerable on several counts. It ignores, for example, the history of
finance, the military, communications, and slavery—realms in which dis-
tributive politics rarely, if ever, prevailed.41 In addition, it overlooks the
history of patents and copyright—or what we would today call intellectual
property. Here was another realm in which, as Usselman and John show,
the bureaucratic autonomy of a federal administrative agency—the federal
patent office—had far-reaching consequences for the political economy.
The patent office, they conclude, was a “bastion of administrative auton-
omy deep within the federal bureaucracy that exerted a subtle yet pervasive
influence on public policy,” and that “anchored the ever-broadening com-
munity of experts, including influential figures in Congress and the courts
who interacted with it as lawmakers and litigants.”
Perhaps the most startling finding of this essay is the rehabilitation
of New York Republican party leader Roscoe Conkling. Although
Conkling is often characterized as the most rapacious of political spoils-
men, he emerges here as the conscientious champion of an economic
order—proprietary capitalism—that was gradually being thrust aside with
the emergence of giant corporations. The granting and regulation of
patents, they demonstrate, had an intellectual integrity that the courts-
and-party construct obscured. To presuppose, for example, that the courts
unambiguously sustained economic development is to overlook the
extent to which competing economic groups (such as railroad managers
and independent inventors) jostled for advantage—as well as the highly
credible threat that unfavorable legal action posed for the railroad, one of
the largest and most powerful economic institutions of the day.42
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The complex role of the courts in economic regulation is the theme
of the final two essays, by R. Daniel Wadhwani and Naomi R. Lamoreaux,
on the regulation of savings banks and the property rights of investors.
Both demonstrate that the nineteenth-century judiciary was less the
supine tool of commercial groups than the courts-and-parties construct
would imply. In the case of savings banks, the courts elaborated on char-
ter restrictions mandated by state legislatures to protect small savers
against the potentially risky decisions of bank trustees. “This innovation,”
Wadhwani concludes, “was in itself highly significant, and in no sense
merely a prelude to the kinds of protection that depositors would come
to be afforded in the twentieth century by the administrative state. Long
before the Great Depression, lawmakers had recognized the need to pro-
tect small savers from the vagaries of the market.” Here was one realm in
which the courts protected not ventures but vested rights.43
The legacy of nineteenth-century public policy is also a theme for
Lamoreaux. In a series of leading court decisions concerning minority
shareholders, Lamoreaux demonstrates, lawmakers systematically discrim-
inated in favor of managers and against investors. This finding,
Lamoreaux elaborates, is relevant to twenty-first-century policymakers
intent on spurring economic development, since it demonstrates that—
contrary to the common view among present-day development experts in
the United States—economic development can proceed rapidly even if
property rights are not secure. Even more important in spurring develop-
ment, Lamoreaux concludes, were the protections government has tradi-
tionally afforded inventors through the patent system, as well as
government-sponsored promotional ventures in transportation, land allo-
cation, the surveying of mineral resources, and education. “Policymakers
interested in economic development today,” she contends, in summariz-
ing her argument, “might well conclude from the preceding discussion
that they have devoted too much attention in recent years to the issue of
property rights and too little to strategies for fostering profitable projects.”
Taken together, the essays in this special issue point toward a new way of
thinking about the nineteenth-century political economy. They character-
ize it neither, like Skowronek’s New American State, as a promise that might
one day be recovered, nor, like McCormick’s Party Period, as the prelude to
things to come. Rather, the nineteenth-century political economy emerges
as a distinctive project that is best understood as a legacy of the founding
of the United States.
The title of this volume, “Ruling Passions,” highlights two eigh-
teenth-century legacies that shaped the nineteenth-century American
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political economy. The first of these legacies was the often-passionate 
preoccupation of lawmakers with the art of statecraft.44 To a degree that
is often overlooked today, nineteenth-century lawmakers took it for
granted that governmental institutions were a major—and often the
major—catalyst for innovation. The second was what one might call the
“moral imperative” of lawmakers to redirect socially destructive passions
into constructive channels.
Each essay in this special issue highlights themes that may well be
unfamiliar even to specialists in the period, and that have yet to be
embraced by policy historians who specialize in the more recent past. At
least in part, this is because policy historians influenced by McCormick
and Skowronek often generalize about the nineteenth-century policy econ-
omy without displaying more than a passing familiarity with either the his-
torical scholarship or the primary sources on which such generalizations
must ultimately be based. All too often, scholarship is based on findings
that are in some instances fifty years old. Few policy historians compare
nineteenth-century governmental institutions to their eighteenth-century
colonial counterparts—or even, for that matter, with their nineteenth-cen-
tury counterparts in Great Britain, France, Canada, or Prussia.45 It is high
time, we believe, for historians who specialize in the nineteenth century to
enter into a dialogue with political scientists and historical sociologists
that will highlight some of the ways in which historical inquiry can con-
tribute to the study of governmental institutions.46
That policy historians have devoted so little attention to the nine-
teenth century is in one sense understandable. There is, after all, good
reason to study the more recent past. The day-to-day lives of millions of
Americans are shaped by the health-care legislation Congress enacts,
while the future of the planet may well depend on the military doctrine
the executive follows. Public policy matters: it is, thus, easy to understand
why so much attention has been focused on issues that are of present-day
concern.
Yet this present-mindedness is not without its subtle perils. Policy
history is predicated on the assumption that institutions beget institu-
tions. It should, thus, be instructive to have a better understanding of the
nineteenth-century governmental institutions that laid the foundations
for the political economy of the present. In addition, in an age in which
the position of the United States in the international political economy
is once again becoming—as it was in the nineteenth century—a matter of
intense concern, it is worth recalling the extent to which the emergence
of the United States as one of the world’s leading economic powers was
a product not merely, or even primarily, of impersonal market forces, but
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also of deliberate design. Finally, in a post-9/11 world—a world in which
the threat of global terrorism has underscored the interrelationship of
governmental institutions, political liberty, and economic development—
it may well be time to acknowledge the achievements, as well as the limi-
tations, of the lawmakers who have devised the governmental institutions
upon which the political economy of the present-day United States has
come to rest.
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